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INTRODUCTION: WELL-BEING’S 
RE-PROPORTIONING OF SOCIAL THOUGHT
Alberto Corsín Jiménez
Man is apolitical. Politics is born in the in-betweenness of  men, hence wholly outside
Man. There is no political substance as such. Politics emerges in the in-between and 
is established as a relation. (Arendt 1997 [1993]: 46)
… liberal political theory should shape its account of  itself  more realistically to what 
is platitudinously politics. (Williams 2005: 13)
What would happiness be that was not measured by the immeasurable grief  at what 
is? For the world is deeply ailing. (Adorno 2005 [1951]: 200)
In describing the Nuer of  the southern Sudan, Evans-Pritchard describes 
Nuer happiness as ‘that in which a family possesses several lactating cows, 
for then the children are well-nourished and there is a surplus that can be 
devoted to cheese-making and to assisting kinsmen and entertaining guests’ 
(1940: 21) This is in line with the Nuer’s larger interest in cattle. Men are 
addressed by names that describe the colour and shape of  their favourite 
oxen; women and children often take their names from the cows they milk. 
Cattle names also figure profusely in songs and poems; and it is cattle, too, 
that are used to prescribe marriage payments, and to define kinship rights 
and obligations. Moreover, men establish contact with the spirits of  their 
ancestors through cattle. Kinship and genealogy are thus expressed through 
the movement, transference and circulation of  cattle.
The focus of  Evans-Pritchard’s famous monograph is not, however, cattle, 
but the organisation of  political institutions, which amongst the Nuer were 
structured around the alignment of  territorial, lineage and age-system 
segments. At different orders of  social organisation (homestead, village, 
clan, tribe, etc.), the principles triggering these segmentary alignments 
create different moments of  political cohesion. In the absence of  formal 
government and legal institutions, the principle of  segmentation worked 
as a principle of  structural politics: it brought disparate people together in 
a unified political project. As a second-, third- or fourth-order alignment 
of  kinship-genealogical connections, then, ‘the political’ thus became the 
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expression of  the Nuer ‘hypertrophy of  [their] single interest’ in cattle (Evans-
Pritchard 1940: 41).
In his work Evans-Pritchard did not address the topic of  well-being directly. 
He is not alone in this in anthropology, where the topic has never been the 
focus of  explicit attention. But, as I hope the above vignette illustrates, his 
extraordinarily rich descriptions of  the social and political forms of  life in 
Nuer country provide an alternative route into the political and theoretical 
imagination of  well-being, one that takes ethnography as its point of  
departure. In this line, this book is about the social theory of  well-being, 
and about anthropology’s contribution to the sociological imagination of  
such a theory. Its main aspiration is to show the relevance of  ethnography for 
thinking through questions of  political morality, and to do so by trying to 
engage in an original and innovative way with the literature on the economic, 
political and philosophical dimensions of  well-being. As the first integrally 
anthropological contribution to the growing literature on well-being and 
the quality of  life, the volume amounts to an effective exploration of  the 
possibilities of  an anthropology of  political and ethical forms. 
The concept of  well-being has emerged as a key category of  social and 
political thought in recent times, especially in the fields of  moral and political 
philosophy, development studies and economics (for example Clark 2002; 
Crisp and Hooker 2000; Dasgupta 1993, 2001; Griffin 1986; Sen 1999; 
Sumner 1996). It has been used by United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in the construction of  its Human Development Index (UNDP 1990, 
1994, 1998, 2002) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in devising 
its quality- and disability-adjusted life-year metrics (Cummins 2005; WHO 
2001; WHOQOL Group 1993, 1998). In this sense, well-being has rapidly 
become a standard currency in economic and political models of  welfare 
and development: the methodological and epistemological building block 
for theories of  cosmopolitan and global justice (for example Nagel 2005; 
Nussbaum 2006). As a toolkit for policy-making, well-being has helped to 
cut through and unify cross-cultural understandings of  what it means to be 
a capable person, bringing together ideas about health, education, political 
empowerment (political and civil rights), gender relations, human rights, the 
natural environment, and individual freedom and opportunities. Associated 
with the notion of  well-being, and perhaps more insidious for what they have 
of  a global morality dictum (Strathern 2005), are parallel discussions about 
the ‘quality of  life’ (Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Offer 1996) and discursive 
generalisations about what constitutes a ‘good life’.
This book takes a critical look at the notion and discursive field of  well-
being, exploring its valency and analytical purchase for social theory from the 
vantage point of  cross-cultural comparison. By examining what well-being 
means, or could mean, to people living in a number of  different regional and 
ethnographic contexts (Sudan–Ethiopian border, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, 
India, Israel, the UK), the collection takes issue with some of  the presupposi-
tions behind Western conceptions of  well-being, at a time when discourses 
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about what characterises a ‘good life’ are being subjected to far-reaching 
scrutiny under the influence of  globalisation and the widespread reach of  
models of  liberal welfarism and development. The book thus intends to open 
new territories in the anthropological study of  political and distributional 
systems of  values and ethical imaginaries, and hopes to establish a major 
point of  departure for those wishing to research the social life of  ethics. The 
volume also makes a contribution to social theory at large by volunteering 
new analytical models with which to make sense of  the changing shapes of  
people’s life and ethical projects.
The rest of  this introduction is concerned with reviewing the recent 
rise of  well-being as a category of  political and economic thought, and 
with disentangling its place in, and consequences for, anthropological and 
social theory. Though I hope to cover sufficient ground to understand the 
significance of  well-being for political theory and social ethics, my review 
of  the literature here is necessarily swift, given the vast number of  works 
that have dealt with the topic. My remit is social theory, narrowly defined 
to cover political and moral philosophy, as well as economics, but not, for 
instance, psychology, despite the latter’s sizeable contribution to the ‘quality 
of  life’ literature (for example Skevington 2002; WHOQOL Group 1993). I 
have concentrated on the former fields because it is in dialogue with these 
disciplines that I believe anthropology’s ethnographic edge can make most 
of  a contribution (though see Thin’s remarks in this volume on the relation 
between anthropology and psychology in this respect).
The review is divided into three sections. In the first section I review 
the place of  well-being in contemporary theories of  political morality and 
distributive justice, where, especially since the appearance of  John Rawls’s 
A Theory of  Justice (1999 [1971]), the concept has gained prominence in 
political thought. Here we take a closer look at how well-being figures in 
contemporary political and moral philosophy, and how it has made its way 
into economic and development theory at large. The section aims to show 
some of  the assumptions behind politics and social distribution in modern 
political theory: about what is ‘political’ and how ‘society’ divides itself  up 
for distribution.
The second section focuses on the naturalisation of  the ‘political’ in social 
thought. It reviews some well-known, both classic and modern, approaches 
to well-being (or surrogate conceptions, such as ‘the good life’) to draw out 
some general conclusions about the kinds of  displacements the notion of  well-
being has effected in our political imagination. The notion of  displacement, 
and especially the size or proportions of  such movements, is important here, 
and will stay with us for much of  the rest of  the introduction, because my 
concern is to focus on how political morality levers social theory. We are 
looking here to understand how ‘politics’, ‘society’ and ‘ethics’ become objects 
or proportionate forms for one another.
The last section brings ethnography into the argument, and does so by 
setting the chapters that make up the rest of  the volume in perspective, and 
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outlining the general contribution that ethnography and anthropological 
theory can make to our better understanding of  social ethics. Here I make 
profuse use of  the idea of  ‘proportionality’, introduced earlier in the text. This 
relates to another concept, that of  the ‘limit’. Building on these two concepts, 
my conclusion intimates that well-being is a holder of  limits: an unstable and 
fragile resting place for the political, upon which press the disproportionate 
shadows of  a (variously conceived) outside world.
EQUALITY AND JUSTICE
All forms of  social organisation work, among other things, as institutional 
systems for the distribution of  social justice (Douglas 1986). What makes 
up the fund of  social justice (say, moral values, such as equality, fairness or 
obligation; resources, primary goods or basic needs; marginal or total utility, 
etc.), how it gets distributed and which institutions do the allocation, and 
how the various elements come together into a system, if  one may speak 
of  a system at all, are of  course matters of  difference and dispute. Political 
philosophy and social choice theory deal in these matters, and do so with a 
view to finding the most reasonable, rational, efficient and/or egalitarian 
ways of  organising the distribution of  justice.1
Variously defined, well-being has always been at the centre of  such debates 
about the social organisation of  justice. As a surrogate of, or proxy for justice, 
the term has been used and invoked to telescope the individual into the social; 
it has allowed economists, political philosophers and policy-makers to collapse 
sociological differences onto a rational template. Different schools of  thought 
have disaggregated this moment of  rationalisation into different units of  
measurement, such as ‘income’, ‘utility’, ‘standard of  living’, ‘quality of  life’, 
‘human development’ or ‘intergenerational welfare’ (for a comparison and 
economic valuation of  each, see Dasgupta 2001). As one would expect, each 
unit yields different results of  what counts as justice and of  where to look 
for it. More importantly, every method has derivative effects on our political 
imagination, affecting the way we come to think of  the ‘persons’ that inhabit 
our theories (Douglas and Ney 1998), and of  the institutional arrangements 
through which these imaginary persons organise their social and political life. 
For there is little doubt that the theoretical semblance of  the kinds of  people 
that aim for, say, utility maximisation is not and cannot be the same as that 
of  those who aspire towards human flourishing – or so our theories say.2
Today debates about matters of  political ethics and distributive justice are 
very much framed by the terms laid out by John Rawls in his A Theory of  Justice,
published in 1971 and described by Bernard Williams as the ‘most powerful 
contribution to Anglo-American political philosophy’ in the twentieth century 
(2005: 29). Rawls’s starting premise shares the foundational assumptions 
of  the classic contractarian philosophies of  Hobbes or Rousseau: the idea 
of  an ‘original position’ or primordial state of  affairs, where people who do 
not know how they fare in life today, nor what kind of  tomorrow awaits 
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them, have to negotiate and choose the institutions that will regulate their 
social lives thereafter. In this scenario, individuals reason behind what Rawls 
famously called a ‘veil of  ignorance’, an analytical device coined to make 
sure that people remain considerate of  the possible interests of  their fellow 
men, for these could turn out to be not unlike their own ‘plans of  life’ once 
the veil is removed.
Rawls maintained that individuals in the original position would all share 
similar kinds of  aspirations, and in particular that they would all want to 
work towards designing a basic social structure whose institutions would 
always and everywhere maximise the well-being of  the worst-off, because 
this could well be the social position they found themselves in once the 
veil was removed. In this regard, Rawls reasoned on the assumption that 
an individual’s intuitions and decisions regarding rational prudence could 
provide a route for solving the larger problem of  choosing society’s basic 
institutional structure (a telescoping of  the individual into the social not 
without its problems, see Nagel 1973). In staging such an inaugural moment 
for the design of  our institutions of  distributive justice, Rawls made it clear 
that the idea of  the right had to be prior to the good, for individuals must 
concede to an idea of  society premised on fairness, where the good of  society 
as a whole cannot be advanced if  it presses against the interests of  any one 
individual. The social structure of  fairness summoned here is thus founded 
on two principles of  justice:
First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system 
of  equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of  liberty for all.
Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of  the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of  fair equality of  opportunity. (Rawls 1999 [1971]: 266)
Rawls articulated this vision for a ‘system of  equal basic liberties’ in terms of  
a list of  ‘primary goods’. These were defined as ‘things which it is supposed 
a rational man wants whatever else he wants…. The primary social goods 
… are rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth’, as well 
as ‘a sense of  one’s own worth’ (Rawls 1999 [1971]: 79). Throughout his 
later work, Rawls has insisted that the focus on primary goods is necessary 
as a minimum legislative requirement, and that those aspects of  political 
morality that fall outside the immediate scope of  the primary goods list (which 
are not few, as we will see below: they touch on matters to do with personal 
differences in physical and mental needs and abilities, as well as variations in 
power and capabilities, between persons and communities) are to be settled 
in a post-original position consensus.
Rawls’s emphasis on the ‘priority of  liberty’, and his fleshing out of  
this inaugural principle in terms of  a basic list of  primary goods, has been 
challenged on a number of  fronts. Critiques have come from all quarters of  
the political philosophy spectrum. Although I do not have the space to dwell 
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in detail on the different types of  critiques, a cursory review will be useful, 
because they touch on questions which go to the very heart of  the anthro-
pological enterprise. Utilitarians like John Harsanyi, for example, criticised 
Rawls for the narrow-minded conservatism of  the rational actors he chose 
to populate his theory with. Harsanyi (1975) argued that risk-taking is 
part of  everyday rational decision-making, and suggested that it could be 
quite feasible for Rawls’s ‘original position’ citizens to decide not to invest 
in the kind of  institutions that would accommodate a worst-case scenario; 
people often do things that go against their long-term interests because of  
the prospect of  considerable short-term benefits. Robert Nozick’s famous 
libertarian theory (1974), on the other hand, challenged Rawls’s model for 
its focus on the procedural outcome of  distributive justice and thus its neglect 
of  the various processes through which redistributions are effectively and 
regularly brought about by society. Nozick’s argument is important because it 
points to the role and mode of  appearance of  the state in distributive politics, 
thus bringing attention to the fact that other social agencies are often just as 
involved in matters of  justice. In this sense, Nozick’s theory further signals 
the importance of  ‘entitlements’ to justice: for Nozick certain rights, and 
most famously the right to property, are inalienable, and the state certainly 
has no role to play in their distribution.
Perhaps it is the so-called ‘communitarian’ critique that most resembles 
the kinds of  reservations that anthropologists would have of  Rawls’s 
work, although I myself  find Bernard Williams’s own variation of  the 
communitarian project (a label he did not endorse) more in the line of  how 
anthropologists think. (Williams [2005: 37] coined the wonderful term 
‘Left Wittgensteinanism’ to label his own political philosophy; I will return 
to his views later.) Communitarian critiques of  the Rawlsian project tend to 
converge on a rejection of  the theory’s conception of  personhood, which they 
see as too abstract. Michael Sandel (1982), for example, noted that Rawls’s 
agents are put in the position of  having to make a decision about their future 
with no knowledge of  who they are; in this sense, their theoretical appearance 
as ‘unencumbered selves’ is utterly meaningless: people’s reasons for doing 
things are always embedded, part and parcel of  their moral biographies, and 
it makes no sense to provide an account of  rational decision-making which is 
dislodged from the moral communities wherein these biographies take shape. 
For if  moral reasoning is not the accounting of  the obligations, debts and ties 
of  solidarity that weave us into a community, then it is nothing.
We can see, therefore, that the debate around Rawls’s theory of  distributive 
justice generated a lively discussion which, though philosophical in principle, 
was deeply informed by issues and categories central to social theory. 
Questions of  personhood, of  the distribution and entitlements of  agency, of  
the structure, responsibilities and appearance of  the state, of  the make-up 
and remit of  moral communities, have all been raised in contestation, or 
qualification, of  Rawls’s arguments, and in the attempt to provide a more 
robust theoretical description of  the mode in which justice ought to appear 
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in society. In dialogue with these philosophical debates, anthropology’s 
historical corpus of  ethnographically informed theoretical contributions 
should therefore certainly be able to help us clarify the conceptual place of  
well-being in social experience.3
I will return to the question of  social theory, and in particular the way in 
which theories of  political morality put certain social imaginaries to work, 
in due course. But first I would like to return to Rawls’s work because it is in 
dialogue with his notion of  justice as a distributed fund of  ‘fair equality’ that 
Amartya Sen developed his extremely influential view of  human development 
in terms of  capabilities, perhaps the most prominent of  all theories of  well-
being today.
One aspect of  the communitarian critique of  Rawls’s work noted above was 
that the design of  institutions of  distributive justice cannot be carried out in 
ignorance of  the concrete social and historical conditions of  a community: 
justice cannot be a matter solely of  procedural arrangements; it needs to have 
a regard for concrete or substantive matters of  social life too. (This element 
of  the critique echoes the famous formalist vs. substantivist debate of  the 
1950s and 1960s in anthropology.) Thus, the critique had it, having outlined 
what the architecture of  social well-being would look like in terms of  ‘fair 
equality of  opportunity’, Rawls failed to note that if  equality is to operate 
as a principle of  justice, its hold over the social organisation of  ‘offices and 
positions’ must also be substantive and not just a matter of  procedural justice; 
in other words, primary goods, in Rawls’s definition, cannot in themselves 
accommodate the right type of  advantage, if  and when inequality is at stake, 
because inequality is never formal but always takes concrete shapes. Said 
differently, to those for whom disadvantage is a given (for example, disabled 
people), access to a set of  primary goods provides no remedial mechanism 
to help overcome their systemic disadvantage. The point was famously 
made by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture on Human Values (1980), who 
observed that such resourcist or commodity (that is, primary goods or basic 
needs) approaches to the question of  distributive fairness failed not only to 
account for the disadvantages in well-being of  (say) disabled people, but more 
generally fell short of  addressing the very real question of  human diversity. 
As Sen succinctly put it, ‘Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of  
advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons 
and goods’ (1980: 216, emphasis in the original). Sen’s point is that a focus 
on primary goods, or indeed on other commodity or utilitarian approaches 
to well-being, is necessarily deficient, because it draws on what people do 
with these goods (for example, they use them to expand their use or quota 
of  liberty, or to purchase certain rights, or to increase their marginal or total 
utility), or on how agents react to their using them (for example, they feel an 
increased sense of  freedom, contentment, pleasure, happiness, etc.) rather 
than on ‘what goods do to human beings’, which would serve to emphasise 
instead how the distributional fund empowers people to do the things and be 
the people they want to be (1980: 219). Sen’s alternative proposition was to 
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develop a theoretical programme that considered the types of  provisioning 
and social arrangements that need be in place for people to share an equal 
fund of  basic capabilities – for people being capable to function as others do.
Over the years, Sen’s call for a ‘basic capabilities’ approach to human 
well-being has become the most famous of  all theories of  political ethics, 
not least because of  Sen’s own involvement in designing UNDP’s ‘Human 
Development Index’. It has also inspired a return to Aristotelian virtue ethics 
in political philosophy, because of  its affinities with Aristotle’s metaphysical 
conception of  human flourishing as personal self-fulfilment (Crisp 1996; 
Nussbaum 1988, 1993). To give the gist of  it, Sen’s view of  well-being is 
founded in a robust analytical programme that holds a view of  human 
development in terms of  the expansion of  ‘substantive freedoms’, which are 
both the means leading to, and the ends resulting from, the instrumental use 
of  political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency 
guarantees and protective securities (Sen 1999: 38–40). For Sen, freedom is 
both constitutive of, and instrumental in, human development.
An important element in Sen’s conception of  human well-being as freedom is 
the analytical distinction he makes between ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’. 
As he puts it, a person’s functioning ‘reflects the various things a person 
may value doing or being … [which] may vary from elementary ones, such 
as being adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to very 
complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the life 
of  the community and having self-respect’ (1999: 75). A person’s capabilities, 
on the other hand, reflect the substantive freedoms that she enjoys or has 
access to in making realisable the functionings of  her choice. The well-known 
example with which he illustrates the difference is that of  the fasting affluent 
person, who achieves the same functionings as the destitute person who 
has no option but starve yet has access to a very different set of  capabilities 
(1993: 40, 1999: 75). The distinction is important because it allows Sen 
to make a second-order distinction, that between the respective places of  
‘achievements’ (functionings) and the ‘freedom to achieve’ (capabilities) in 
both our well-being and, more generally, our agency towards our life goals, 
which may or may not have to do with our well-being. This allows Sen to 
come up with a four-fold classification, that includes: (1) agency and (2) 
well-being achievement, on the one hand, and (3) well-being and (4) agency 
freedom, on the other (1993: 35). This perspective emphasises as much the 
opportunities that people have to bring about changes in their lives, as the 
processes that allow them to realise such visions. In Development as Freedom, for 
instance, Sen develops this point in relation to the question of  the social status 
and agency of  women. Women’s freedom to pursue and achieve goals other 
than their own personal well-being, Sen argues, has important consequences 
for, among other things, community, family and children’s development. 
Fostered by the provision of  female education, employment and property 
rights, women’s agency can, for example, play a crucial role in the reduction 
of  birth-rates, as widely shared observations on the relationship between 
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literacy and fertility rates attest. It can also make an important contribution 
to changes in the patterns of  distribution of  resources within families, with 
women playing a leading role in household decision-making; or in children’s 
welfare, often promoting a reversal of  the gender bias against the survival 
of  young girls; or in attitudes towards environmental conservation, when 
women acquire rights to land and become involved in agricultural work (Sen 
1999: 190–203).
Sen’s nuanced philosophical anthropology carries its own social theory. 
Albeit it is not Sen’s concern to make this explicit, some aspects of  his 
sociological imagination are informed by an analytical finesse that one 
seldom finds in the work of  anthropologists or sociologists. His theory of  
personhood is a case in point. Here people’s agency and location in a structure 
of  reflexive choices is described as being conditioned and oriented by a set 
of  functionings and capabilities; inflected by instrumental and constitutive 
factors; and qualified by a temporal horizon of  achievements and freedoms. 
Such a broad and yet nuanced conception of  how a person makes her 
appearance in a political and social field is impressive. Moreover, all such 
analytical distinctions are operational, readily available to policy-makers for 
public action – a formidable achievement by all accounts.
There is an aspect to Sen’s programme, however, where his social theory 
starts to become problematic.4 This is best illustrated if  we ask of  his work 
the question that Bernard Williams (2005: 54) demands be put to all political 
philosophies: what does a theory do to the circumstances that summon it? 
The question would not, of  course, come as a surprise to Sen, who is a self-
declared rationalist and universalist (Sen 2002). But it does beg the problem 
of  how a political philosophy (indeed, any theoretical programme) relates to 
its field of  action: how a description of  the world embeds itself  in that world. 
Williams’s critique of  the discipline of  political philosophy holds that all its 
different versions stand discursively outside the world. They are not part of  the 
world, and certainly not written in the language of  sociological contrasts that 
make ethical practice substantively real (see also Castoriadis 2002 [1999]: 
166). Political philosophy is not political, and it is not political because it lacks 
sensibility to historical particularities (cf. Mouffe 2005 [1993]).
Williams makes one exception to such characterisation of  political 
philosophy: what he calls, with Judith Shklar, ‘the liberalism of  fear’ (Williams 
2005: 52–61). Shklar makes a distinction between the liberalism of  fear, the 
liberalism of  natural rights and the liberalism of  personal development (1989: 
26–28). For Williams, who shares Shklar’s view on this score, the liberalism 
of  fear is the only truly universal form of  political thought, because it is the 
only philosophy whose ‘materials are the only certainly universal materials 
of  politics: power, powerlessness, fear, cruelty, a universalism of  negative 
capacities’ (Williams 2005: 59) It is the only form of  political thought that 
keeps the political inside. And it is this aspect of  the embeddedness of  politics 
that brings the limitations of  Sen’s rationalist programme to light.
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For Williams, the asymmetry of  power that the liberalism of  fear takes to 
be the basic category of  political life provides no ultimate reference point for 
what ‘unfreedom’ may look like, except that it entails being in someone else’s 
power. All conditions of  coercion and unfreedom are local and historical. 
In these circumstances, it is not ‘freedom’ that is of  political value, but 
the ‘condition of  life without terror’ (Williams 2005: 61). This is the first 
requirement for political life. It may be followed, indeed it ought to be followed, 
by the gradual securing of  other rights, but these cannot be prescribed by 
philosophy, and can only emerge through local processes of  political and 
historical discovery.
Following Williams’s insistence on a mode of  political reasoning that 
captures, and takes recursive advantage of, its own sociological contrasts, 
the next section takes a closer look at some of  the social and political objects 
that have been made to inhabit, and animate, classical political thought on 
well-being. Its focus is on how politics has been ‘displaced’ from political 
argument (Williams 2005: 58), made to appear in a place ‘outside’ the 
political, in what I will call the naturalisation of  political reasoning, or its 
autarkic justification.
THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE POLITICAL
Appeals to nature, or justifications of  a natural kind, are well known in 
institutional theories of  political justice, the classical case being natural rights 
and law. Norberto Bobbio puts it bluntly when he says that the ‘philosophical 
presupposition of  the liberal state … is to be found in the doctrine of  natural 
rights developed by the school of  natural rights (or natural law)’ (2005 
[1988]: 5). In anthropology, Mary Douglas once glossed these sociological or 
moral arguments under the banner of  the so-called ‘principle of  coherence’. 
She observed that ‘the principle of  coherence must … be founded on accepted 
analogies with nature. This means that it needs to be compatible with the 
prevailing political values, which are themselves naturalized’ (1986: 90). 
Thomas Scanlon has used the term ‘teleology’ to make a similar point: 
the idea that certain ‘states of  affairs’ have intrinsic value, that is, a value 
that naturally belongs to the state of  affairs, and where the state of  affairs 
thus lends itself  to an end-based conceptualisation of  the ethical (1998: 
79–87). Well-being is no different. In the literature, well-being often evokes 
an image of  (basic) closure, a minima moralia represented by roundedness or 
completeness. We have seen some examples above: in the foundational self-
sufficiency of  primary goods (Rawls), the natural inalienability of  property 
rights (Nozick) or the appeal to a conception of  freedom as the capability to 
function (Sen).
Appeals to autarkic justification, however, have an old pedigree in the 
humanities. They are the expression of  natural thought’s settled and 
balanced appearance in the political organisation of  the human condition. 
From Aristotle’s idea of  happiness as eudaimonía, the perfected life, where 
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the accomplishment of  the supreme good of  rational self-sufficiency is 
informed by a metaphysics of  natural growth, that is, where only the exercise 
of  contemplative reason realises human’s functional capacities to their full 
(Kenny 1992), to Hannah Arendt’s famous conception of  the ‘human 
condition’ as ‘the modes in which life itself  … makes itself  felt’ (Arendt 1998 
[1958]: 120), of  which the metabolic vitalism of  ‘labour’ figures as its first 
moment of  expression; throughout Western political thought, then, one 
finds an urge to locate a resting place for politics in (some form of  expression 
for) nature’s wholeness, and in particular to make some variant of  autarkic 
morality a central category of  political life.
The manner in which ideas about autarkic wholeness have circumscribed 
and shaped contemporary political thought have, therefore, in this sense, 
been determinative of  our larger conceptualisation of  ‘society’, and of  the 
ways in which different people make their own articulations of  social ethics 
appear. As we have seen above, enfolded in the notion of  well-being one 
finds competing social models about the organisation of, and articulations 
between, the public good and private life. Said differently, different theories of  
well-being produce different versions of  how and when society appears as a 
whole, under the banner of  social justice, the state or cosmopolitanism; and 
how and when it appears as a part, under the labels of  individualism, rights 
or moral claims;5 about, also, the legislative instruments and formations of  
such parts-and-wholes assemblages, as in human rights law or the respon-
sibilities of  states or international agencies for structural poverty (Williams 
2006); and, furthermore, about the movements and orientations of  reason, 
which sometimes hold people together in moral communities, welded by 
ties of  solidarity, obligations or debts, and sometimes keep them separate, 
sanctioned as autonomous and rational agents (Overing 1985). In other 
words, all theories of  well-being carry a social theory within them, that works 
to naturalise a programme of  political morality, where all kinds of  problematic 
social objects and categories clash in a confrontation that threatens to tear 
apart the stability of  the programme.
In this section I want to examine how the autarkic tendency of  political 
thought has created its own social objects of  inclusion, first and foremost 
‘society’, but also other ethical artefacts, such as ‘life’, ‘politics’, the ‘economy’, 
and that complex hybrid of  all of  the above which is ‘well-being’. A good 
place to start to understand the work of  this type of  political naturalism 
is Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE), because it is here that he develops a 
political argument around virtue ethics, and because it is virtue ethics, as 
noted above, that some political philosophers have turned to in recent times 
(for example, Nussbaum 2005, 2006; see also Lambek, this volume).
Aristotle’s view on the perfect life rests on a biological paradigm, where 
all things tend towards their teleological functional end. And human 
happiness, Aristotle tells us, is no different. In fact, for Aristotle happiness is 
the supreme good, the end towards which other activities tend: ‘the complete 
good is thought to be self-sufficient … the self-sufficient we now define as 
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that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and 
such we think happiness to be’ (Aristotle 1984 [c. 4 BCE]: I.7.1097b5–17). 
Jonathan Lear has examined in detail the movement of  Aristotle’s thought 
in the NE, and concluded that what one sees at play in Aristotle’s ethical and 
political thought is the development of  a ‘structure of  trauma’ (Lear 2000: 
45). Happiness is defined throughout the NE as a state of  self-fulfilment, 
the highest of  the virtues, or ‘goods’, of  practical life. What Aristotle means 
by self-fulfilment, however, is never clear; or rather, the definition is always 
on the move, self-effacing itself. According to Lear, the process is first set in 
motion when Aristotle introduces his definition of  ‘happiness’: this should be 
read as an ‘inaugural instantiation’ (2000: 8), where Aristotle both injects 
the concept into our life and prefigures the structural shape that our life itself
will need to take for happiness to occur inside it (2000: 26). The gist of  Lear’s 
argument is that Aristotle is a ‘seducer’ (2000: 22), someone who never quite 
ties his subject down because he keeps shifting attention to new objects of  
ethical curiosity: happiness is a matter of  practical virtuousness, which when 
looked closely turns out to be a matter of  self-sufficiency, which suddenly 
makes problematic the question of  life as a whole, which on second reflection 
opens up a new perspective on the relationships we have to others in life, and 
thus on solitude and contemplation, which is ultimately something that only 
the gods can do full time, and is thus a reminder of  our mortality and of  the 
very limited nature of  happiness, wherever it turns out to reside. Every one 
of  Aristotle’s intellectual movements aims therefore at ‘remaindering’ itself  
out: at creating a surplus or space ‘out there’ from which things look different; 
or, as Lear puts it, ‘any form of  life will tend to generate a fantasy of  what it 
is to get outside that life’ (2000: 48, emphasis added).
Lear’s is a psychoanalytic take on Aristotle’s ethical project, although his 
insights into the remaindering tendencies of  his thought have sociological 
validity too. Indeed, Lear himself  notes how, in a last and desperate movement, 
Aristotle tries to save his ethical edifice, which crumbles from the pressures 
that keep displacing it, by resorting to the political principle of  law enforcement 
(2000: 58). Politics is Aristotle’s last desperate attempt at safeguarding the 
integrity of  his ethics. We need politicians and legislators to guarantee our 
peaceful existence, to provide us the time of  leisure necessary to lead a life 
of  contemplation. In this light, politics becomes both a means and an end; 
at once the vehicle and goal of  political life, the impetus behind, and the 
constraining system of, political organisation.
Now the appearance of  politics as the regulatory mechanism of  ethical life 
suddenly creates its own sociological forms. Aristotle’s own thought contains 
some clues: outside political life, we have seen, only contemplation can deliver 
ethical sovereignty; inside politics, however, this now obtains through the 
work of  friendship, for Aristotle believed that, amidst the frenzy of  practical 
life, only in friendship can one come close to experiencing the ‘complete’ 
goodness of  happiness (Marías 1989: 67–89). Friendship and contemplation 
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become, in this light, reversible forms: one achieves in social intercourse what 
the other obtains in solitude.
In his essay, Lear makes the point that, in postulating an outside for political 
life in contemplative activity, Aristotle appears to be valuing death, for only 
in a deathlike state do we find ourselves properly removed from the pressures 
of  practical life (2000: 53). This is a convincing argument, and Lear has 
good reason for pursuing it, for his interest is in elucidating the contribution 
that psychoanalysis can make to virtue ethics. But here I want to focus on 
the sociological dimensions of  Aristotle’s thought instead. And though 
death might indeed be an appropriate outside for politics in psychoanalytic 
terms, there is also a case to be made about its sociological counterpart. Said 
differently, if  we focus our analysis within the political, the play of  revers-
ibilities noted above (friendship:solitude) casts its own sociological ‘outsides’ 
or remainders. 
As it turns out, the remaindering moment of  political life inside politics is 
given by tyranny. In a remarkable essay on the ‘shadows’ of  Western political 
thought, Eugenio Trías (2005) has observed that the Aristotelian virtue of  
friendship is in fact obtained, in the classical context, as the figure-ground 
reversal of  tyranny. Using Plato’s description of  tyranny as the hostis or public 
enemy of  the republic, Trías shows that for the tyrant any and all forms of  
social mobilisation are potentially threatening to the status quo. To uphold his 
mantle of  dominance, the tyrant must of  necessity exercise violence over the 
social body as a whole: there must be no place outside, or remainder over, the 
reach of  the tyrant’s power (2005: 134–35). Only the tyrant can stand outside
society. Tyranny thus makes ‘society’ appear in an inverse relation to what 
friendship and its social ethics enables. More importantly, this moment of  
appearance makes ethics in turn a residue of  a form of  proportional sociality, 
where the tyrant’s need for unlimited or disproportionate political violence 
creates a total social object (‘society’), which leaves no or very little space for 
ethical action. Classical Greek thought, then, effected a set of  displacements 
between ‘ethics’, ‘politics’ and ‘society’, whose sociological imagination was 
essentially incommensurable,6 and where ethics thus appeared as a leftover 
of  political organisation.
The question of  the size or proportional forms that ‘society’ takes in politics, 
only vaguely noticeable in Aristotle, makes a central appearance in Hannah 
Arendt’s The Human Condition (1998 [1958]). Arendt wrote The Human 
Condition in the wake of  the Hungarian Revolution of  1956 and, like many 
of  her works, it is an attempt to make sense of  the political predicament of  
humankind in the aftermath/presence of  totalitarianisms and unprecedented 
state violence. The classic locus is Auschwitz, which for Arendt brought about 
the collapse and confusion of  society ‘over elementary questions of  morality’ 
(Arendt 2005 [1963]: 125). Margaret Canovan has said of  the book that 
it is an attempt to grapple with the ‘miraculous openness and … desperate 
contingency’ of  political action (1998: xvii), a view that contrasts sharply 
with Aristotle’s explicit, if  flawed, teleological framework.
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Arendt’s vision for humanity is intrinsically possibilistic, embedded in a 
rich and recurrent world of  beginnings, from the birth of  a new human 
being to the ‘space of  appearance’ which characterises pure political life, and 
to which she gives the name vita activa, the ‘life devoted to public-political 
matters’ (1998 [1958]: 12). Elsewhere Arendt described this life of  action 
and recurrent nativity as ‘miraculous’, and ‘the political’ as the place where 
one can hold out and hope for miraculous happenings (1997 [1993]: 66). 
The institutional organisation of  such assemblies of  hope has taken different 
shapes at different historical times, and Arendt dedicates much of  The Human 
Condition to contrasting classic and modern modes of  convention. Effectively, 
what Arendt attempts in this book is an archaeology of  the different ways 
in which ethics, society and politics have been conjoined or separated in 
Western political thought, and does this by exploring the different modes 
of  articulation of  the categories that she calls ‘labour’ (as we will see, 
contemporary political thinkers – like Sen – would call this ‘well-being’), 
‘work’ (sociality) and ‘action’ (politics).
Central to our interest here is the way in which Arendt makes the concept 
of  ‘society’ appear as a proxy for understanding the very functioning of  the 
life process, in a way not unlike how Aristotle makes ‘politics’ the end-point 
of  a teleological process. For Arendt, the rise of  ‘society’ as a concept of  
theoretical significance in the modern age marked the moment when ‘the 
life process itself  … [had] been channeled [sic] into the public sphere’ (1998 
[1958]: 45). There are two movements to this conceptualisation. First, we 
need to understand that Greek thought lacked a concept of  society. Social 
life, as we understand the term today, was circumscribed to the realm of  
the household (oikonomia). Social relationships inside the household were 
conducted to provide for the biological necessities of  survival, what Arendt 
called the life of  labour. Outside the household, on the other hand, men 
encountered one another in the reality of  the polis, where the space and 
possibility for political life effectively took shape.
We come to the second movement. The Greek situation, Arendt observed, is 
starkly different from our own. She insisted that our contemporary equation 
of  the public with ‘society’ is a peculiarly modern phenomenon, characterised 
by the movement of  ‘life’ (that is, labour) out of  the realm of  the household 
and into the public sphere. The new public sphere is thus a political economy: a 
household (oikonomia) gone public, where the routines of  everyday survival, 
the labours previously hidden in the privacy of  the household, have now 
acquired public status.
In typically poignant and lucid style, Arendt concludes that this new ‘society’ 
is ‘the form in which the fact of  mutual dependence for the sake of  life and 
nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected 
with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public’ (1998 [1958]: 46, 
emphasis added). In this world, the political organisation of  survival amounts 
to, and in effect requires no more than, its economic organisation. This is 
why, for Arendt, contemporary political philosophy falls short of  fulfilling 
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its intellectual project unless it takes charge of  the analysis of  the economics 
of  industrial labour and the new regimes and organisation of  technocratic 
work; and why, when she described our modern world as a ‘society of  laborers’ 
(1998 [1958]: 46), she was in fact making a profound metaphysical statement 
about the sociology of  our contemporary human condition.
Well-being is not a term that Arendt uses, although if  we were to endorse 
the current interest in biological functionings her notion of  ‘labour’ would 
play an analogous sociological and political role. In this sense, what Arendt’s 
analysis brings to the imagination of  well-being as a political category is her 
insistence that the appearance and disappearance of  sociological categories 
(the rise and death of  the ‘household’, ‘society’ or ‘the public’) is fundamentally 
entangled with the political organisation of  the life-process.
The point has in fact been recently brought home by Giorgio Agamben 
in his analyses of  the structures of  sovereignty and the modern state. In 
The Open (2005), Agamben suggests that our historical and ever-shifting 
sense of  humanity entails, at its very heart, a debate with its own animal 
condition. Agamben’s definition of  our human nature dwells on the idea 
of  opening or caesura, the very movement and debate through which the 
human condition takes stock of  its ever-displaceable limitations: in other 
words, how people constantly push their de-finitions (their limits) outside 
(2005: 28, 77). For Agamben, this historical conversation with ourselves 
about the possibilities of  our own animal nature makes for one of  the most 
fundamental categories of  political life. Historically, we have come to define 
our politics through consciousness of  our humanity’s natural limits.
Today, however, Agamben argues, the place of  this most basic political-
cum-metaphysical relation (between our human and animal conditions) has 
been displaced (2005: 53); the relationship has disappeared from our political 
vocabulary, the human and the animal reciprocally hollowing each other out 
from our existential equation (2005: 36). No longer a central aspect of  how 
we define ourselves, the disappearance of  our human-animal openness from 
our existential consciousness has left us historically homeless; the structure of  
human life has been evacuated of  its historical condition and been left nude 
of  itself. Today, humanity is ‘bare life’ (see also Agamben 1999).
Like the social organisation of  Arendt’s ‘sheer survival’, ‘bare life’ carries a 
political moment of  its own and Agamben’s oeuvre at large is dedicated to the 
task of  fleshing out its sociological episteme (see Agamben 1996, 2000, 2004). 
In Means without Ends (2001), for example, Agamben criticises the moment of  
spectacular politics through which the modern state takes its form (cf. Debord 
1995 [1967]). All modern political communities, states included, endorse a 
vision of, and become institutional guarantors for, a foundational programme 
for the ‘good life’ or ‘sufficient life’ of  the community.7 This substantive 
approach to political life has been corrupted in modern government, where 
politics has become an autarkic goal in itself, no longer a means to an end 
(Agamben 2001: 97). We are witnesses here to politics’ consummation of  
its own teleological end: having arrived at its historical telos, humanity has 
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become animal once again, realizing the exhaustion of  the human project 
(Agamben 2005: 98). The point is a simple one: politics, Agamben suggests, 
is no longer about managing the understanding of  our human-animal 
condition. The relationship has been cancelled and a final definition of  what 
we are – sheer life – stabilised. In our present conjuncture, then, humanity is 
left with no task other than the management of  its own biology, a return to the 
oikonomía or life of  labour that Arendt ascribed to the pre-political (that is, the 
household). With Foucault, however, Agamben believes that this moment of  
epochal self-consumption is nevertheless capable of  re-politicisation, indeed, 
it is a political moment itself, and he identifies three domains where this is 
happening: bioethics, the global economy and the new political economy of  
well-being or humanitarian assistance (2005: 99).
Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff  (2004) have recently furthered this 
line of  thought from an anthropological perspective. They have explored the 
global appearance of  what they call ‘regimes of  living’, by which they mean 
the coming together of  political, technical and moral forces in the creation of  
temporarily stable funds of  ethical reason: where ‘ethics’ emerges as a signpost 
to the kind of  new questions about human nature and the life process that 
have been opened up by technological reason and biopolitics (see also Ong and 
Collier 2005). Regimes of  living are, in this light, anthropological artefacts 
of  ‘bare life’, for which there appears to be no shortfall of  examples: the 
liberal ethics behind the regulation of  new human reproductive technologies 
(bioethics); alternative legal and appropriative modes of  intervening in or 
generating capital flows (global economy); and the counter-politics and 
claims to citizenship of  the urban disenfranchised (global humanitarianism) 
(Collier and Lakoff  2005). These and other developments, Collier and Lakoff  
argue, are calling for a new formulation of  the question ‘How should one 
live?’, where the means of  techno-political practice (how), the protocols and 
models of  evaluative behaviour (should) and the subjects of  ethical reflection 
(one) are cast anew for every new regime of  life. 
In the notion of  ‘regimes of  living’ we find thus an analytical device with 
which we can start mapping both the displacement of  the political and its 
substantive reappearance in concrete claims for ethical recognition. Arendt 
and Agamben’s critical reading of  the taking over of  the political by the 
economic offers support to such a view of  political morality as a moment of  
fugue. Comparing their views with Aristotle’s insights into the development 
of  ethical life provides further evidence of  the location of  political justice in its 
outside or remaindering spaces. In reviewing the writings of  these authors I 
have therefore hoped to serve two purposes. First, I hope to have shown that 
there is no single space where one may look for well-being. Liberal political 
philosophy provides us the means to analyse the ways in which modern 
society makes questions of  justice and equity appear (to itself); it does not 
provide us with a recipe for isolating well-being as a universal value. For 
modern plural society, questions of  distributive justice become questions 
of  state sovereignty, where political morality is a matter of  the legislative 
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administration of  biological life. But this account of  how well-being ought 
to be distributed arrives already a political moment too late: it is supported 
on an architecture of  social institutions that finds no empirical counterpart 
in how society recognises and assembles its different parts together.
A second purpose of  my selective review has been to bring attention to the 
way in which political philosophy creates its own sociological imagination. I 
have attempted to provide a sense of  the way in which ‘society’, ‘politics’ and 
‘ethics’ (or their absences) are assembled in different proportions every time 
human nature or the human condition are invoked to legitimate a political 
programme for the sustenance of  life. Another way of  saying this is to note 
that political categories take different proportional sizes; that they create a 
lever for themselves by distributing their own contrasts or remainders from 
other categories. Not to attend to these contrasts is therefore to mistake the 
distribution of  justice for a decision about resource allocation: to think of  
politics as a one-sided gesture rather than as a continuous displacement in 
the ‘terms of  recognition’ of  society itself  (Appadurai 2004).
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRASTS
I want to turn now to some concrete examples of  how people create their 
own spaces of  recognition by re-proportioning the imagination of  the ‘social 
wholes’ to which they belong. I do so by providing a critical commentary 
to the chapters that follow. I do not review my own chapter, which is but a 
theoretical reformulation of  the argument I have been developing in this 
introduction.
The comments, and the chapters, are organised around three themes: 
‘Distributive Values’, ‘Persons’ and ‘Proportionalities’. The chapters 
themselves, however, should not be read as examples or elaborations of  the 
themes that I ascribe to them. They touch on these issues, but they certainly 
touch on many more too. My choice simply reflects the introduction’s 
narrative strategy, and my own theoretical interests.
Distributive values
Justice and equality are, still to this day, political philosophy’s classic distri-
butional values. Theories abound on how they ought to be conceptualised, 
where to look for them and how to distribute them; we have looked at some 
of  them in this introduction. Distributions, however, should not simply be 
seen as moments in the institutional allocation of  values.8 We can lend more 
purchase to the notion of  ‘distribution’ if  we think of  it as a social moment 
too. What is given away is always an index of  what is left behind. How people 
make themselves available to others, or, in Thomas Scanlon’s sober phrasing, 
what we owe to each other (Scanlon 1998), is therefore always already a 
distributional moment: an expression of  society’s dislodgement of  itself  into 
the parts that it values. This is what social life amounts to: the ongoing re-
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evaluation and re-distribution of  sociality itself. To attend to these social 
moments of  evaluative redistribution is to attend to the configuration of  
the political.
The focus of  Ian Harper and Bryan Maddox’s chapter is precisely the 
ordering of  ‘the political’ in Nepal, with particular attention to its mode 
of  disappearance in development discourse and practice. Their argument 
revolves around two examples: public health interventions and literacy 
programmes, which they candidly gloss as ‘the view from the clinic’ and 
‘the view from the classroom’, respectively. Health and literacy are, of  course, 
fundamental constituents of  well-being; they are both dimensions of  the 
Human Development Index, and both contribute a central set of  functionings 
in Sen’s capability approach. Both are values, then, that have been institu-
tionally sanctioned for distribution.
Public health interventions in Nepal have been guided by what Harper 
and Maddox call an ideology of  ‘pathologisation’, where the body politic is 
medicalised and benchmarked against normalised (bureaucratised, fiscal, 
chartered) conceptions of  the diseased and afflicted. Examples abound and 
include the introduction of  the Disability-adjusted Life Year metric (DALY), 
the Directly Observed Therapy Short-course programme for the treatment 
of  tuberculosis, or the vitamin A capsule distribution programme. These 
programmes are designed to leave politics ‘outside’. The recipients or 
beneficiaries of  these programmes are counted as ‘bodies’, whose well-being 
directly correlates with the distribution and delivery of  medical treatment. 
The social context of  intervention is thus neutralised. Health problems are 
the problems of  ‘individuals’; the structural inequalities and social conditions 
that make life for these individuals ‘problematic’ (from a normalising 
perspective) is rarely, if  ever, considered. And when they are considered, the 
bureaucratic logic tends to pathologise them too, part of  a discursive field of  
‘social pathologies’ that includes terrorism, corruption, crime, violence and 
human rights violations. The view from the clinic thus polarises the world into 
pathological beings and ‘well beings’. Under such conditions, the moment 
of  appearance of  the political takes the form of  what Harper and Maddox, 
following Finkielkraut, call ‘humanitarianism’. Their analysis echoes on this 
point Agamben’s diagnosis of  the governance of  ‘bare life’.
The view from the classroom presents a contrasting scenario which comes 
to confirm the distressing realisation of  a view of  development predicated 
on the absence of  politics. As they argue, literacy is nothing if  not a political 
affair. A long tradition of  anthropological scholarship on literacy has shown 
that the shaping of  literacy practices is deeply embedded in social contexts 
that are always complex and burdened with inequalities. To fetishise literacy 
as development agendas do is therefore, once more, to uproot the political 
from the social moment of  action to which it belongs.
Eric Hirsch takes up the question of  comparing institutional and social
perspectives on the distribution of  values. His chapter offers a rich description 
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of  two different ‘distributional logics’ at work in Fuyuge responses to state 
welfarist policies in contemporary Papua New Guinea (PNG). PNG is the 
focus today of  very significant resource extractive operations (mining, for 
the most part), which have already had a massive impact on the local ways 
of  people. The scale of  the operations has surpassed the cultural capacity of  
the Fuyuge (and other PNG) people to accommodate their sense of  well-being 
to the new situation (see also Rumsey and Weiner 2004). It has turned them 
into ‘patients’ rather than ‘agents’ of  development, to use two terms that 
Hirsch adapts from Sen’s work. To understand how this has happened Hirsch 
contextualises his argument by first outlining the historical conditions under 
which the state made itself  present to Fuyuge and other PNG people during 
colonial times, and by relating these to Fuyuge understandings of  what they 
call mad ife, the good ways or, we would say, well-being.
The Fuyuge notion of  ‘good ways’ carries a number of  corollaries. It is 
supported on the presence of  an amede or ‘chief ’, a person who can summon 
and unify all Fuyuge productive relations (productive, that is, of  other 
relations, not just goods). In colonial times, the good ways of  the amede were 
contrasted with those of  ha u bab, men with a renowned capacity for instilling 
fear. With the advent of  colonial government the ways of  ha u bab disappeared, 
and people today speak appreciatively of  ‘the law’ for having furnished an 
environment where they can walk around without fear of  attack, and for 
providing also the means (for example, money) with which to make relational 
life yet more productive.
Fuyuge appreciation of  ‘the law’, however, is contrasted with their reaction 
to resource extractive operations. Mining corporations require a legislative 
framework to carry out their projects: they need landowners to compensate 
for the use of  land; they need provincial, national and governmental 
stakeholders (schools, local elites, ministers, officials) with whom to negotiate 
the terms of  access and exploitation. These are not categories that Fuyuge 
relate to. Coerced to participate in a distributional game the scale of  which 
exceeds them, the Fuyuge have had a hard time ‘converting’ the wealth of  
their land resources into a valuable set of  relational capacities. Whereas 
the introduction of  ‘the law’ allowed the Fuyuge to act as both agents and 
patients with regard to one another (that is, to reciprocally augment their 
relational capacities), resource extraction demands from them an orientation 
towards redistributive exchanges where the form of  their human capacities 
has no value. Hirsch’s elegant analysis is therefore significantly poignant 
because it carries the implication that not all distributions, and certainly not 
the wholesale distribution of  wealth (Hirsch uses the term ‘quality of  life’), 
contribute to our well-being. Running through his argument we find thus 
the suggestion that certain distributive processes (that is, Fuyuge exchanges 
of  relational capacities) are in fact antecedent to what we have come to know 
as the sanctioning moments of  institutional distributive justice.
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Persons
It has become a commonplace in anthropology to describe the Melanesian 
model of  personhood as a ‘distributed’ or ‘fractal’ person.9 Hirsch’s description 
of  Fuyuge’s relational exchanges of  capacities, and their coercion and 
concentration into one visible ritual (gab) appearance, provides a partial 
illustration of  this: people bringing together their relations into a unified 
(whole) appearance for a gab ritual; and, inversely, people disaggregating 
land relations into (partial) claims for resource compensations.
This distributed (parts and wholes) view of  the person is not wholly foreign 
to political philosophy. The communitarian school, with its emphasis on the 
holistic understanding of  moral and biographical agency, holds a similar 
view, though its analytical framework, and certainly its social theory, is 
very different. What both approaches have in common, however, is the 
underlying appreciation that if  the notion of  well-being carries any moral 
meaning whatsoever, it must in principle reflect people’s ownership over its 
description. Well-being must be carried through persons. An analytic of  
well-being that does not contribute to a more robust theory of  the person is 
therefore already lacking. 
Keeping the whole of  the person in view is what Wendy James reminds 
us about in her account of  the modern discursive use of  well-being in the 
context of  development. Her critique resonates with Bernard Williams’s 
call to historicise our liberal notions of  justice. Like Williams, James finds 
in the current use of  the rhetoric of  well-being a fastidiously modernist and 
a-historical presumption about how individuals ought to fare in life – and 
like Williams, too, she finds R.G. Collingwood’s philosophical conception of  
history instructive, especially in regard to how people construct their evolving 
sense of  self. She reminds us, for example, of  the classical Azande conception 
of  the enhancement and protection of  personal capacities via magic. Under 
such circumstances, she asks, how are we to make sense of  the notion of  ‘well-
being’, when the capacity of  agents to carry out their plans is enmeshed in 
complex structures of  potential and hidden forces? The point echoes Hirsch’s 
analysis of  the relational coercion of  capacities, and is extended to suggest 
that if  well-being is to retain its purchase as an analytical category it needs 
to be mobilised into a more robust (historicised) theory of  personhood.
A final aspect of  James’s sober argument that I would like to comment 
on is the distinction she makes between ‘welfare’ and ‘well-being’, and 
her intimation that, worked into the distinction is a heavy baggage of  
assumptions about the interrelations between state provision, individual 
enhancement and the modern political economy of  liberal justice. This is a set 
of  assumptions that we need to remain sceptical of, especially if, as her own 
history of  ethnographic fieldwork in North East Africa attests, ‘the “normal” 
background of  people’s lives [is] a theatre of  conflict’. Her description of  
refugee camps in Ethiopia tells us of  the absurdity of  looking for well-being 
in situations where a community’s historical sense of  purpose has been 
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evacuated – where people are told, and slowly come to realise, that they will 
never return to their old ways of  livelihood. These people, James reminds us, 
are surely in desperate need of  welfare provision; but who will ever deliver 
or return to them their well-being, and how?
In her account of  how three teenagers describe the hold that diabetes 
has over their lives, Griet Scheldeman provides a partial answer to James’s 
question: in her ethnography, well-being emerges as the process of  satisfac-
torily managing the incorporation (literally, into the body) of  a relational 
complex, at the heart of  which is one’s sense of  ownership over one’s life. 
Scheldeman offers us an extraordinarily thick description and elucidation 
of  how capabilities are existentially performed and brought to life; where a 
medical condition (diabetes) suddenly foregrounds the functioning of  the 
body as the ultimate determinant of  how life is faring for oneself, rather than 
how one fares in life.
For the teenagers that Scheldeman worked with, though varying in their 
satisfaction with the use of  an insulin pump to control their affliction, freedom
was the Aristotelian conception of  the good that defined whether life (with 
the insulin pump) was good or not. They wanted to regain the freedom they 
once enjoyed (and that they saw in fellow adolescents) to do as they pleased 
– to do the things teenagers do, go the places teenagers go to, without an 
obsessive concern for the care of  their bodies. Well-being became thus about 
the staging of  the right conditions (learning to live with an insulin pump, 
or without one: to play with its control panel, to count calories, to think of  
a corresponding insulin dose and administer it) to make life itself  invisible: 
to accomplish the transition from a situation where life itself  has hold over 
one’s freedom to one where one is freely in control of  one’s life.
It is at this juncture that the ‘quality of  life’ discourse takes over. What does 
it mean to make the conditions of  life invisible, to hide them behind the veil 
of  freedom? (Is the veil of  freedom not what Rawls invited us to think with 
when placing us behind a ‘veil of  ignorance’?) This is no rhetorical question. 
Quality of  life in the Scottish city of  C, where Scheldeman carried out her 
fieldwork, is hardly something one can turn a blind eye to. Characterised by 
‘financial hardship, third-generation unemployment, teenage pregnancies, 
violence, broken families, [and] unhealthy diets’, the notion of  ‘empowering’ 
adolescents to live the life they want to live takes a rather disconcerting turn. 
Scheldeman’s chapter invites us to reflect about our own existential categories, 
and to seriously reconsider how and where (in which social contexts) we 
decide to place them when conjuring the notion of  well-being.
Another richly ethnographic description of  the emplacement and living 
of  well-being in action is to be found in Nigel Rapport’s many-layered 
account of  ‘professional well-being’ amongst a group of  hospital porters 
at Constance Hospital in Easterneuk, Scotland. I can hardly do justice to 
the ethnography with a brief  summary here. What I would like to draw 
attention to is Rapport’s insistence on the need to open our analyses to the 
‘aesthetics’ of  people’s ongoing appropriations of  their selves and their life-
Jimenez 01 intro 21     16/8/07 09:19:13   
22 Culture and Well-Being
worlds; or, as he gracefully puts it, the need to constantly actualise ‘the 
connection between the rhythms of  selfhood and the shapes and forms of  its 
environments’. This is of  course a holistic enterprise, although for different 
people we can attempt to discern the different aspects of  its institutional, 
social and personal manifestations. Rapport does this by focusing on four 
aspects of  the life-rhythms of  porters’ professional lives: movements around 
the hospital site; movements between the hospital and the outside world; 
moving between being a porter and a patient; and the existential fragility of  
the life-rhythm itself, thrown into relief  by the maximal antithesis of  what 
well-being is, namely, death. Central to Rapport’s rich experiential analysis of  
how porters take on the rhythmic thrusts of  every one of  these existential and 
environmental pressures is the notion of  proportion or balance. At various 
points he observes that the porters’ sense of  well-being evinced in a feeling of  
balance: ‘Just as well-being called for a balance or proportion to be achieved 
between work and play, health and sickness, and so on, so there was a proper 
proportion to the way the claims one staked should be recognized.’ The 
balancing metaphor should not, however, be interpreted for what it has of  
stability or repose. Rapport’s focus on ‘movements’ is in this sense a crucial 
analytical insight: to be well one needs an appreciation of  the ‘proportionate 
movement’ through which one becomes and grows into a person. This is the 
‘aesthetics’ of  which he speaks in his introduction: well-being as the artful 
covering-up of  our future remainders.
Proportionalities: the remaindering movement of  life
When people give themselves to others, and to themselves, in different 
distributive guises, we can describe such efforts in terms of  proportional 
give-aways. We have seen an example in Rapport’s account of  the rhythmic 
accommodations of  porters’ life-projects to their institutional surroundings. 
Proportionality has of  course long been a dominant metaphor and explanatory 
paradigm in philosophical descriptions of  moral reasoning and theories of  
ethics at large. One need only recall the image of  Dike, the Greek goddess of  
Justice, holding level the scales of  justice in her hand. My own chapter in this 
volume takes up this issue of  the image and ideology of  proportionality in 
our ethical thought, tracing some of  its earlier uses in economic and political 
thinking, and attempting to unpack some of  the analytical consequences 
that are borne out from making the idea of  proportionality explicit in and 
to our social theory.
There is an echo here with Slavoj Žižek’s psychoanalytic philosophy 
(for example, Žižek 2006). Although Žižek has not directly addressed the 
question of  well-being, he develops an interesting and analogous position 
with regard to the concept of  ‘human rights’ (Žižek 2005). Žižek argues that 
what the rhetoric of  human rights accomplishes is to cover-up the elision that 
universal human rights proclamations effect over concrete political economic 
conditions. What is interesting is thus not what is universal and what is 
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particular, but the political movement through which this ‘gap’ is opened 
up in the first place. What we ought to be paying attention to instead, then, 
is how political interventions remainder our communities into particulars 
(parts) and universals (wholes). In other words, how we re-proportion our 
social thought.
Proportionality, however, is also an indigenous category. What gets balanced 
and taken ‘into account’ is always a matter to be elucidated ethnographically. 
Michael Lambek, for instance, explores in his chapter how the notion of  well-
being, as a political and experiential category, is evinced through the fragile 
and not always easy balancing of  social and personal alternatives. He offers us 
a profound reflection on the possibilities of  anthropology as ethical practice; 
that is, on the contribution that ethnographic description can make to what 
he calls, with Alexander Nehamas, the ‘art of  living’: the internal variations 
in people’s practical engagement and evaluation of  the lives they are living. 
Staging a dialogue between C.B. Macpherson’s notion of  human capacities 
and Sen’s capability approach, and exploring the purchase of  the Aristotelian 
conception of  virtue ethics as practical moral development, Lambek draws 
some important conclusions about the liberalist habit of  economising the 
process and practice of  living. Of  the many important points he makes, I 
would like to draw attention to two that relate directly to what has been said 
in this introduction. The first is his intimation that whatever well-being is, 
we always need to remember that, once summoned, the concept will come 
with its own social context. Echoing Bernard Williams’s criticism of  scale-free 
liberal political theory, Lambek reminds us that ‘the well-being of  any given 
social unit … must always be contextualized with reference to the well-being 
of  the social unit at the next levels of  inclusion’. There are thus two outsides 
to well-being: an outside to its scale (outside its level of  inclusion) and an 
outside to the concept itself. This relates to the second of  Lambek’s points 
that I would like to mark here. Throughout the chapter, Lambek observes that 
the idea of  well-being appears to be inherently escapist: communities change 
and, with them, the generational perception of  social well-being; values and 
goods once internal to life become commoditised and externalised, turned 
into objects of  consumption rather than of  self-realisation; the passions 
that once animated these aspirations become routinised or suppressed into 
our unconscious. Happiness and unhappiness emerge thus as mutually 
determinative, forever displacing each other in a continuous reversible 
movement (Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev 2006). Or, echoing Lear, whom 
Lambek cites, forever remaindering each other out.
Happiness is the topic of  Neil Thin’s chapter. Thin offers us a comprehensive 
review of  anthropology’s astonishing silence in matters of  happiness, 
despite the discipline’s avowed commitment to the holistic understanding of  
indigenous worldviews. Emphatically, he insists throughout that not engaging 
with the study of  happiness is irresponsible, because it is an indirect way of  
endorsing a non-evaluative stance on human conditions: anthropology needs 
to outgrow its relativist frame, and to define a new political space for itself.
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In a beautiful book called La espera y la esperanza: historia y teoría del esperar 
humano (Wait and Hope: The History and Theory of  Human Expectations) 
published in 1957, Spanish philosopher Pedro Laín Entralgo wrote a recon-
sideration of  Heidegger’s philosophical anthropology by using as his point 
of  existential departure, not angst as Heidegger had done, but hope (Laín 
Entralgo 1957). Although by no means a political manifesto, the exercise 
proved illuminating because it cast in a new light the politics of  possibility 
in Franco’s Spain: an anthropology of  hope opens up very different political 
spaces to one that is based on anxiety, let alone violence or revolutionary 
struggle (cf. Miyazaki 2004). (I recall here Arendt’s description of  the political 
as the space of  hopeful or miraculous appearances.) In his chapter, Thin 
criticises those studies of  the existential condition of  humanity that have 
a preference for focusing on what he calls ‘negative minimalisms’, to wit, 
suffering, violence, deprivation, destitution, etc. In this sense, I believe Thin 
would converge with Laín Entralgo in thinking that our conceptual point of  
departure for describing human experiences is fundamentally determinative 
of  how we allow people to represent to themselves their own capacities for 
action. This is why I take it to be that both negative minimalisms and (let us 
call them) hopeful maximalisms work in fact as political limits (Trías 2005): 
they delimit the social theory that is built around them, re-proportioning 
in their wake the size of  the political. It is for this reason intriguing that our 
politics today is constructed out of  the minimum common denominator of  
‘sheer survival’ and ‘bare life’. In this perspective, it would seem that the only 
hope for the good life today would be to press against its minima moralia, to 
stand as liminal morality. For as Adorno put it, ‘Exuberant health is always, 
as such, sickness also. Its antidote is a sickness aware of  what it is, a curbing
of  life itself’ (2005 [1951]: 77, emphasis added) 
The question of  the curbing and delimitations of  life is elucidated in James 
Laidlaw’s chapter on the contemporary redistributive practices of  diasporic 
Jains, where he explains how Jainism’s social ethic is today shifting from 
a commitment to virtuous self-fashioning to an utilitarian (aggregate) 
conception of  well-being in terms of  the alleviation of  suffering.
Jainism is a religious tradition of  renunciatory asceticism. The world, 
for Jains, is a space of  relational predation, where all living organisms are 
continuously exercising violence on all others. We kill the creatures that 
inhabit the water we drink, when we drink it and when we take a bath; we 
kill the food that we eat, when we eat it and when we cook it; we kill the 
creatures that populate our surroundings, when we take a walk or when we 
roll over in our sleep. The world is tensed with immanent violence. Jainism 
thus cultivates a pedagogy of  negation, what Laidlaw calls an ‘ethic of  
quarantine’: disciplining the self  into a regime of  renunciation, learning 
not to harm the world by separating one’s own being from the world, and 
devaluing one’s own being.
Now the ideology of  renunciation remains at some level a canonical repre-
sentation of  Jainism’s ascetic soteriology; it is not an ethnographic description 
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of  how Jain communities live their everyday lives. But, Laidlaw observes, it 
does provide an ethical and aesthetic counterpoint to quotidian affairs. In this 
sense, the ideal of  renunciation provides a point of  reference against which 
Jains re-proportionate their own understanding of  what, at different junctures, 
is appropriately austere or opulent. ‘Well-being and the ascetic pursuit of  
release’, Laidlaw writes, ‘are contrasting but mutually supporting.’
The imagery of  ‘juxtaposition and movement’ between self-destructive 
temptation and disciplined asceticism conjures its own forms of  existential 
limitation, its own coordinates for what Adorno called the curbing of  life. In 
particular, the image of  life as liminally tensed in a fragile and proportionate 
accomplishment is thrown vividly into relief  if  we attend to Laidlaw’s 
comparison of  Jainism’s soteriological tradition with modern diasporic re-
interpretations of  non-violence.
Traditional Jain emphasis on non-violence and the potential intercon-
nectedness of  all life forms, Laidlaw tells us, has found a cohort of  friendly 
contemporary interlocutors in the environmental and animal rights 
movements. Laidlaw observes how some commentators, especially among 
Jain diasporic communities, are presenting Jainism as an ancient precursor 
of  these movements. These eco-reinterpretations of  Jain philosophy have, 
however, profoundly distorted the original ethical orientation of  Jainism. In 
the tradition of  renunciatory Jainism, ethical consciousness emerges from 
one’s realisation of  the world’s inherently disgusting nature. Here asceticism’s 
capacity for ethical conduct is cultivated through the virtue and praxis of  
world-distanciation, where ascetics’ striving for release from their bondage 
to the world is held as the highest aspiration. This is profoundly different 
from eco-Jainism’s novel sympathetic appreciation of  nature. Violence and 
suffering, far from being intrinsic qualities of  the world, qualities that should 
indeed be conducive to our self-motivated worldly-cum-ethical liberation, are 
instead seen here as inductive to further engagement with the world. Eco-
Jains build on their conceptualisation of  the connectedness of  all life forms 
to advocate the proactive alleviation of  suffering as a way to improve the 
aggregate, collective well-being of  us all. However, as Laidlaw boldly observes, 
such a reorientation of  Jainism towards ecological ethics works only insofar 
as it effects a profound hollowing out of  the terms of  relational violence that 
made Jainism eco-friendly in the first place. Violence and sympathy are not 
equivalent reversibles in traditional Jainism. Only non-violence, that is to say, 
non-worldliness, is conducive to ethics.
An ethics predicated on the absence of  life, or on a life that is the existential 
precipitate of  disciplined renunciations, renunciations that use the limits 
of  the world (Trías 1985) to curb life’s virtuousness; such a life casts its 
own sense of  magnitude-in-the-world in terms that are disproportionately 
different from the eco-Jains’ vision of  the world as an integrated and holistic 
totality. How people delimit the world for themselves and for others – how, 
that is, they re-proportion their sociological imagination10 – thus becomes 
a central question for understanding the making of  collective and personal 
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life-projects, including the delineation of  projects of  well-being. Stephan 
Feuchtwang (2006), in a recent article on the interlacing of  political and 
cultural idioms of  the exceptional (pace Agamben) and the ambivalent in 
the realisation of  the imagery of  the ‘sub-human’, has made an interesting 
observation to this effect. For Feuchtwang, the political condition of  the 
sub-human finds a fitting resource for its imagination in the language of  
asymmetries and imbalances, for example, cannibalism, sacrifice, bestiality 
or exorcism, images all of  ‘extreme forms of  imbalance or blockage of  bodily 
intakes and flows’ (2006: 259). In this context, he opts to exemplify the 
political governance of  the spaces of  humanity through the image of  the ‘king 
at death: the asymmetry between the power of  life and the powerlessness of  
the body that is almost a corpse. It is the sovereign power over life and the 
power to abandon life to death’ (2006: 268). Here the human as a political 
project – the king and his royal purchase over life and death – casts its own 
shadow as an effect of  the disproportionate: of  excess and surplus, of  self-
consumption and exhaustion, of  the ‘limits of  the world’ that circumscribe 
the human condition as, in the words of  Castoriadis, a figure of  the thinkable 
(2002 [1999]). It is not life or death, then, biology or eschatology, that singles 
out and determines what well-being is, but the various sizes of  the political 
worlds that we inhabit and that furnish our human condition with a sense 
of  our own proportionate possibilities.
* * *
I conclude with a brief  word about the conceptual purchase of  the notions 
of  the ‘limit’ and the ‘proportion’ for social theory.
My use of  the concept of  the limit takes inspiration from the work of  Spanish 
philosopher Eugenio Trías (1983 [1969], 1985, 1991, 1999, 2005). Over the 
years, Trías has developed an ontological programme for understanding the 
human condition as a liminal condition, where the moment of  openness to 
the creativity of  action, as Arendt would put it, is given by our inhabiting the 
threshold of  meaning. Here the world that we know reveals itself  as a moment 
of  tension, where the order and organisation of  our place-in-the-world is 
provided for by a fragile and extreme alignment of  ontological happenings. 
By signalling the place where our world exhausts itself, where the alignment 
is evinced and the world reaches its end, the concept of  the limit thus further 
helps to break up and displace the world for us.
It is this facility to bring into focus or identify the displaceable that I take 
to be the limit’s potentially valuable contribution to social theory. In this 
perspective, limits are useful to think with, because they signpost society’s 
own model of  self-consciousness: how society redistributes its own social 
moments. They mark the cleavage point at which one social proportion 
remainders itself  away from another, thus casting a shadow over the social 
body – and giving the social body a ‘size’. ‘Individuals’ and ‘society’ are the 
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classic example: their size is given by their own remaindering-away from 
their opposite. 
Using the imagery of  the gigantic, James Weiner has recently appealed to 
a similar conceptualisation of  the limits and proportionate remainders of  
life in the following terms: 
What is gigantic in human life? If  we consider nature itself  as only a social construction, 
we lose the sense of  a domain that lies beyond the power and limits of  the human and that is 
therefore large in comparison to it. We might then want to ask, what confronts human 
life with something that exceeds it? What lies beyond human life but nevertheless 
exerts an influence on it? (Weiner 2001: 163–64, emphasis added)
Following Weiner’s call for an anthropological imagination of  the gigantic, 
we can start to think of  well-being as a liminal category: a holder of  limits. 
What existential pressures induce the curbing of  life? When and how does 
life start to displace and resize itself: when does it become larger-than-life, 
and when does it contract its own powers, become something disgusting or 
embarrassing? Where, in sum, does the gigantic lie for different people: how 
do people re-proportion their life-projects, and how do they cement and put 
limits to them?
Using an epistemology of  the gigantic, of  limits and proportions, the 
anthropology of  well-being could thus be re-described as the anthropology 
of  residual politics: a theoretical vision for political theory that works with 
an idea of  society as a remaindering polity; a social theory that looks for the 
politeia or community in the movements through which it outgrows itself, 
pressing its own limits, gaining a sense of  its own proportions. A theory, then, 
that keeps its own social objects of  description (society, ethics, politics, well-
being) within purview – at a variable and yet proportionate distance.
This is of  course a project for comparative social theory, for all limits 
are Janus-faced, constraining on one side, expansive on the other; and a 
proportion is by definition a relation of  magnitude, a relation to something 
of  a different order than itself. It is thus a project that reaffirms ethnography’s 
unique analytical value. Only through the insights gained from ethnographic 
comparison can we open up social theory to new forms of  what Williams 
called realist or platitudinous politics. Seen in this light, it makes of  course 
all the sense in the world that Evans-Pritchard decided to focus on cattle 
as the idiom through which to re-describe the Nuer’s political organisation 
of  well-being. For it was relations established through cattle that held in 
proportion Nuer political life.
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NOTES
 1. Anthropologist Michael Blim has recently written a very elegant book arguing for a 
view of  human well-being in terms of  the value of  (political, economic and social) 
‘equality’ (Blim 2005). Blim’s conception of  equality is broad enough to accommodate 
social and cultural differences, although I think I do justice to his account if  I say 
that his interest is not social theory. His challenge is how to arrive to a robust enough 
conception of  equality that will allow its endorsement as a global value.
 2. This a limitation of  theory, because people are of  course known for giving different 
reasons for pursuing one and the same action; some reasons may be rendered as 
‘utilitarian’, some ‘communitarian’, some ‘existential’, etc.; some are accounted for in 
terms of  desires, preferences, even behavioural inclinations or instinctual predisposi-
tions. It is at this level that political philosophy is at its analytical messiest. On ‘kinds 
of  persons’, and the implications of  different categorisations and classifications of  
personhood for policy-making, see Hacking (2002, 2006).
 3. On the category of  the person, see, for example, Bird-David (1999), Carrithers et al. 
(1985), Collins (1982), Corsín Jiménez (2003), Douglas and Ney (1998)  and Strathern 
(2004); on the distribution and entitlements of  agency, see for instance Gell (1998), 
Hann (1998), Strathern (1999), Verdery and Humphrey (2004) and Wilson and 
Mitchell (2003); on the anthropology of  the state, classic and recent contributions 
include Cohen and Service (1978), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Geertz (1980), 
Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Taussig (1997); on the place of  solidarity, obligation and 
debt in the making of  moral communities, the list is as extensive as the discipline itself; 
some classic references include Fortes (2004 [1969]), Mauss (2002) and Mauss and 
Hubert (1964); for some recent scholarship see Godelier (1999), Komter (2005), 
Laidlaw (2000), Strathern (1988) and Sykes (2005).
 4. A caveat is in order: the following critique of  Sen’s social theory applies to economic 
theory at large (see also Gudeman 1986). In all truth, Sen has probably done more 
than any other scholar to make both his economic modelling and his social theory 
sensitive to one other. (Partha Dasgupta’s efforts in this regard are also worthy of  praise 
[1993, 2001].) The question remains, though, whether there is an inherent limit to 
how much social theory economics can take into account. I do not mean to be flippant: 
the problem is how to design institutional models of  resource allocation that are reflexive 
and thus responsive to sociality’s own redistributive orientations; for economics needs 
to pre-empt sociality’s own redistributive moments for its institutional allocations to 
take effect.
 5. On parts and wholes configurations, see Strathern (1991, 1992) and James (this 
volume).
 6. There is no ‘sociological’ thought in Aristotle, as we have come to understand the 
term today. The closest he comes to developing a ‘sociology’ is in his Politics, but even 
here he produces an analysis of  the politeia as ‘community life’ (Marías 1951: xlix). 
The point is important because it gives a sense of  the extent to which ‘ethics’ and ‘the 
good life’ were conceptualised within the political, but never within society. On the 
relation between ‘the political’ and ‘community’, and the evacuation of  the former 
from the latter in modern social life, see Esposito (2003 [1998]) and note 7, below.
 7. A point that echoes Roberto Esposito’s argument that modern political thought is 
organised around the ‘immunisation’ of  life (2003 [1998], 2005 [2002]). For Esposito, 
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the modern conception of  a political community depends crucially on the disassembling 
of  the social into ‘immunised’ individuals. Thus, there is no social life proper in modern 
politics: immunitas is the basic condition for all associative life, a diagnosis that situates 
Shklar and Williams’s ‘liberalism of  fear’ in harrowing historical perspective.
 8. However, institutions can be seen too as redistributional movements; see Corsín 
Jiménez (2007) for an outline of  a theory of  redistributive institutional life; see also 
Douglas (1986).
 9. Marilyn Strathern’s work is the classical referent here; a recent exposition of  her 
thought in relation to the topic of  medical health (well-being) is Strathern (2004)
10. ‘If  there is any value in carrying the discussion forward,’ Marilyn Strathern has written 
of  social theory’s prospects, ‘it is because the question of  proportionate description
remains in the anthropological account’ (1991: 53–54, emphasis added)
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